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Abstract
We develop a bioeconomic model to analyze a sole-owner shery with xed
costs as well as a continuous cost function for the generalized Cobb-Douglas
production function with increasing marginal returns to e¤ort level. On the
basis of data from the North Sea herring shery, we analyze the consequences
of the combined e¤ects of increasing marginal returns and xed costs. We
nd that regardless of the magnitude of the xed costs, cyclical policies can be
optimal instead of the optimal steady state equilibrium advocated in much of
the existing literature. We also show that the risk of stock collapse increases
signicantly with increasing xed costs as this implies higher period cycles
which is a quite counterintuitive result as higher costs usually are considered
to have a conservative e¤ect on resources.
Keywords: Bioeconomic modelling; Stock collapse; Fixed costs; Pulse
shing; Cyclical dynamics; Increasing marginal returns.
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature on sheries economics assumes that the revenue func-
tion is concave in harvest (decreasing marginal returns), and in most cases,
especially in the sole owner case, the solution converges to an optimal steady
state equilibrium. After such an equilibrium has been established, harvest
and stock levels remain constant forever. There are, however, various reasons
why increasing marginal returns (non-concavities) may be relevant in sh-
eries models, and especially in the case of sole owner sheries or cooperative
games. Such reasons may for example be sharing of information, co-operation
between vessels on the shing grounds, economies of scale in the technology,
etc. It is, however, not likely that these phenomena will occur in competitive
sheries or non-cooperative game situations as the agents there will have
no incentives to co-operate, share information or apply economies of scale
beyond their own individual benet. In the presence of non-concavities in
the revenue function the optimal solution may no longer be a steady state
equilibrium. Optimal solutions may consist of various types of cyclical poli-
cies or pulse shing implying, among other things, increased danger of stock
collapse even in the sole owner or cooperative case.
Empirically increasing returns have been found to exist for species such
as North-Atlantic cod (Hannesson [6]) and North Sea herring (Bjørndal and
Conrad [1]). Hannesson [6] found pulse shing to be optimal for the cod
using an age-structured model.
2
The dynamic optimization problem unquestionably becomes harder to
solve in the increasing return case as standard assumptions about dynamic
optimization theory fail. Also numerical solutions become more di¢ cult to
obtain as no rate of convergence can be derived from standard theory. In
order to solve the problem we have used a discretization algorithm described
in Maroto and Moran [16] in order to estimate the value function and the
corresponding optimal policy numerically.
In the present paper a bioeconomic model is applied to analyze a sole-
owner shery with increasing returns to e¤ort level using a stock dependent
harvest function. The sole-owner case may also represent a cooperative case
through a construction like a Regional Fishery Management Organization
(RFMO). Special emphasis is put on the combined e¤ects of increasing re-
turns and xed costs. Fixed costs are here dened as avoidable xed costs
(AFC); that is costs that are xed in the sense that they are independent
of the volume of the harvest as long as harvest is positive, but they become
zero when harvesting ceases. In practice, these can be thought of as the sum
of actual harvest-independent costs such as e.g. minimum wages to the crew,
etc., and the opportunity cost of harvesting; that is the revenue from the best
alternative activity. Re-entry costs are not considered as it is supposed that
the vessels use more or less the same gear and equipment when they engage
in other sheries. Hence entry and exit to and from particular sheries are
considered costless.
The model consists of a continuous harvest function within each period
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in order to take into account the change in the sh stock that takes place
during the shing season. Hence the cost of shing is also a continuous func-
tion within the season. After harvesting has taken place there is a discrete
updating of the stock between the periods.
The main contribution of the present paper compared to the existing
literature is to show the following: First, in the presence of increasing mar-
ginal returns to e¤ort level in a stock dependent harvest function the optimal
steady state equilibrium advocated in much of the existing literature can be
suboptimal. When there are increasing returns, cyclical policies can be op-
timal regardless of the magnitude of the AFC. Further, in contrast to the
standard literature (Reed [20]; Lewis and Schmalensee [13]), such cyclical
policies are optimal even without introducing re-entry costs. In the North
Sea herring case considered in our numerical example such re-entry costs are
not relevant as the vessels have several alternative sheries to choose among.
Although the cyclical policies take the form of "trigger recruitment - tar-
get escapement" policies, it is important to note that in our case these are
caused by the trade-o¤ between discounting the future and the convexity of
the revenue function in addition to possible xed costs. In traditional models
with concave revenue such policies will never occur without some sort of xed
costs or re-entry costs.
Secondly, we show that if the harvest function depends on the stock in
the beginning of each period, then a high, but still reasonable, discount rate
can cause extinction to be optimal even for stocks with high growth rates
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and in the absence of xed costs. In the case of lower discount rates (higher
discount factor values), the resource might be in danger of collapse because
cyclical optimal policies drive the resource below the precautionary approach
reference point proposed by the International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea (ICES). This can be regarded as extensions of results obtained in
Maroto and Moran [17] where we, in contrast, use a stock dependent harvest
function. Previously, a proper form for the harvest or cost function that
takes account of the change in the stock during the shing season has not been
established except for the trivial case of the Schaefer production function (e.g.
Jaquette [10], Reed [20]), and for the case in which the production function
is non-linear in stock level (Reed [21]) as far as we know. In this paper
we formulate the cost function for the generalized Cobb-Douglas production
function of which the above cases are a special case. This results in an explicit
cost function that depends continuously on both stock and harvest. In this
case (continuous harvesting case), we show that optimal cyclical policies can
periodically drive the resource to levels approaching Safe Minimum Standards
and below (stock-collapse) even in the absence of xed costs. A continuous
cost function in both harvest and stock is the appropriate cost function to
use when the harvested fraction of the stock within a season is signicant
or when the stock is small. This implies that the stock can be economically
protected as the cost of harvesting escalates when the stock comes close to
extinction.
Thirdly, we show that higher AFC implies higher period cycles and con-
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sequently higher danger of collapse due to the combined e¤ect of increasing
marginal returns and AFC. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result as
higher costs usually are considered to have a conservative e¤ect on the stock.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a back-
ground of continuous harvesting models with cyclical optimal paths. Section
3 presents the main bioeconomic model with a discussion about the con-
tinuous harvest function applied and in section 4 a discussion about the
consequences of xed costs is given. Finally, in section 5 we present some
concluding remarks.
2 Background
Similar models as described above have been analyzed by e.g. Lewis and
Schmalensee [11, 12, 13] and Reed [20]). In Lewis and Schmalensee [12] a
continuous time model is used to show that under AFC and strict concavity of
the revenue function either continuous harvesting or extinction represent the
optimal policies. An important assumption in that paper, however, is that re-
entry into the shery after harvesting has once ceased is impossible. Lewis
and Schmalensee [11], on the other hand, assume that re-entry is possible
and costless. They also consider AFC, and they show that the possibility to
enter and exit the shery without re-entry costs e¤ectively eliminates the non-
convexity induced by the AFC. Further, they show that it may be optimal to
maintain the stock at a constant level through so-called chattering controls
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(innitely rapid changes in e¤ort and harvest). Such policies are cyclical but
the cycle intervals are of length zero and therefore infeasible for all practical
purposes.
In Reed [20] a discrete time model is used to show that under positive re-
entry costs an optimal policy is of the target-escapement type in the absence
of AFC. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the optimality of cyclical
policies is given in Lemma 1 of Lewis and Schmalensee [13]. They show that
optimal policies are cyclical if and only if it is optimal to change the sherys
operating status (operating/vacated) innitely often. They get this result by
taking both AFC and re-entry costs into account simultaneously. Liski et al.
[14] improve the realism in their model by introducing ow adjustment costs.
These adjustment costs represent ow costs associated with, for example,
hiring more labour or buying new vessels. By doing this they show that for
relatively high adjustment costs the usual steady state is optimal whereas
for relatively low adjustment costs cyclical harvest policies become optimal.
The existence of cyclical optimal paths in present value optimization of
resource management was rigorously proved by Dawid and Kopel [4] from a
theoretical point of view, in a model with increasing returns to e¤ort level
in a stock independent harvest function and a piecewise linear growth func-
tion. Further research by these authors (Dawid and Kopel [5]) proved that,
if the elasticity of the convex revenue function is high enough and the growth
function is smooth and concave, there cannot exists an optimal steady-state
path. In that paper, they showed through a numerical experiment that a con-
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cave growth function and a concave cost function might give rise to cyclical
optimal paths.
The standard assumption on the growth function in the numerical analysis
of Dawid and Kopel [5] left open the possibility that optimal cycles due
to increasing marginal returns do exist in actual sheries. The numerical
analysis based on the data of the North Sea herring shery described in
Maroto and Moran [17] fully conrms the plausibility of existence of optimal
cyclical paths in actual renewable resources management.
3 Bioeconomic model
In this section a bioeconomic model is developed to analyze a shery with
increasing marginal returns as well as xed costs. There is discrete updating
of the stock between the harvesting seasons and continuous harvest within
the season. Thus the cost function is a continuous function of both stock
and harvest during the harvest season.
The discrete population dynamics for the resource is given by
xt+1   xt = F (xt) Ht; (1)
where xt is the total biomass at the beginning of period t, F (xt) is the
natural surplus growth of the biomass at period t; and Ht is the total harvest
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at period t. By dening
f(xt)  xt + F (xt) (2)
as the recruitment (the stock at the beginning of the period) equation (1) can
be rewritten f(xt)  xt+1 = Ht. This implies a constraint on the escapement
(stock after harvesting) which we call y. This constraint in the optimization
problem described below is given by
y  f(x); (3)
which implies H = f(x)  y  0.
3.1 Costs with continuous harvesting
In this section we develop a novel cost function which is depending on the
running stock size and harvest within each season. Let h and e be the harvest
and e¤ort rates and let x be the stock at time t. Further, let the instantaneous
production (harvest) function be a generalized Cobb-Douglas function
h = qex; (4)
where q is constant,  is the e¤ort elasticity and  is the stock output elas-
ticity.
9
Total costs during the harvest season are given by
C =
Z T
0
cedt; (5)
where T is the length of a harvest season and c is the instantaneous cost per
unit shing e¤ort. During the harvest season we assume that the stock is
only being changed by shing mortality. Hence x =  h and
e = q 1=x =h
1
 = q 1=x =h
1

 1h = (6)
= q 1=x =h
1

 1( x) =  kx =h 1 1x;
where k = q 
1
 . Assuming a constant harvest rate through the season, and
using (6), the costs during the harvest season are given by
C =
Z T
0
cedt =
Z T
0
 ckx  h 1 1xdt = (7)
=
Z y
f(x)
 ckx  h 1 1dx = ckh 1 1
Z f(x)
y
x 

dx =
= ckh
1

 1[x1 

=(1  =)]f(x)y =
ckh
1

 1
1  = [f(x)
1  
   y1   ]:
The constant harvest rate in the season can be replaced by f(x) y
T
in (7).
The costs during the harvest season are then given by
C(x; y) = 
f(x)   y
[h]'
= 
f(x)   y
[f(x)  y]' ; (8)
10
where  = ckT
'

, f(x) is as dened in (2), y is as dened in (3), k = q 1=,
 = 1  = and ' = 1  1=.
The net revenue function from the shery is given by
R(x; y) = pHt   C = p [f(x)  y]  C(x; y); (9)
where p is the unit price of harvest.
In order to take into account the presence of increasing marginal returns
and the relatively weak dependence between stock and catch per unit e¤ort in
this shery, we assume an e¤ort elasticity  > 1 and a stock output elasticity
 < 1 in (4), respectively. As described below, these parameter values are
empirically estimated for sheries on schooling stocks such as North Sea
herring (Bjørndal and Conrad [1], Hannesson [7]). Notice that the harvest
function estimated by Bjørndal and Conrad [1]
H(Et; Xt) = qE

t X

t ; (10)
represents the total catch during period t, but it is assumed here that they
represent a fairly good approximation to the parameters in (8).
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3.2 The objective functional
The objective functional is the present value (PV ) of net revenues from the
shery
PV =
1X
t=0
tR(x; y) (11)
where R is as dened in (9) and  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor.
The objective function can be rewritten
max
fxt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tR(xt; xt+1) (12)
0  xt+1  f(xt); t = 0; 1; :::;
x0 > 0 given, R(xt; xt+1)  0; t = 0; 1; :::;
where x0 is the initial stock level. If f(xt) is as dened in (2) then f(xt)  
xt+1 = Ht in (12).
Using the dynamic programming approach, we can dene the following
Bellman equation associated with (12)
V (x) = max
0yf(x)
fR(x; y) + V (y)g: (13)
Unfortunately, a closed form solution of (13) is unattainable. The required
concavity assumptions on which the standard theory rests are not borne out
in this situation (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [22]) due to the presence of
increasing marginal returns. The standard theory is not able to assess any
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rate of convergence for the numerical algorithms. Subsequent increases in
the discretization grid used in numerical computations can cause signicant
changes in the outputs.
We use here the approach described in Maroto and Moran [15, 16], where
an alternative framework, based on Lipschitz continuity assumptions is pro-
posed. In Maroto and Moran [16], a discretization algorithm is described
for the numerical estimation of the value function and the optimal policy
correspondence solutions of (13).
3.3 Avoidable xed costs
Fixed costs are here dened as avoidable xed costs (AFC); that is, costs that
are xed in the sense that they are independent of the volume of the harvest
as long as harvest is positive, but they become zero when harvesting ceases.
In practice, these can be thought of as actual costs that are independent of
the harvest volume such as minimum wages, etc., plus the opportunity cost
of engaging in the shery. The latter is dened as the revenue from the best
alternative activity. In the current model, AFC are given by
AFC = cv; (14)
where c is a percentage of the variable cost per vessel c and v is the eet
size in number of vessels which is given.
AFC as dened in (14) can be thought of as a measure of alternative
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activities from the shery which range from zero to something around the
annual gain rate from the present shery.
The Bellman equation is now written
V (x) = max
0yf(x)
RAFC0
fRAFC(x; y) + V (y)g; (15)
where RAFC(x; y) = R(x; y)  AFC.
Notice in Problem (15) that in the case in which y < f(x), the shery
is operating (h > 0) which in turn implies positive AFC > 0. In this case,
negative prots are possible. However, in the case in which y = f(x), the
shery is vacated (h = 0) which in turn implies AFC = 0 in (15). In this
case, RAFC = 0. This means that the shery may thus yield negative prots
at su¢ ciently low levels of harvesting, even though zero harvesting would
produce zero net benets.
3.4 North Sea herring shery
In order to make realistic the numerical experiments while keeping their
scope of application wide enough, we take as our starting point the North
Sea herring shery.
North Sea herring is a representative case of a schooling species. In spite
of its resilience and ecological value, this species has been driven to collapse
by heavy economic exploitation. Indeed, the North Sea herring stock was in
danger of extinction in 1977 when a moratorium on shing had to be imposed
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due to the overexploitation su¤ered in the 1970s under an open access regime
(Bjørndal [2]). In the mid-1990s the North Sea herring stock was in danger
of collapse again (ICES [9]). Moreover, the medium term simulations of the
ICES indicate a high probability for the stock to be below safe biological
limits in future years (ICES [9]).
North Sea herring is a joint stock shared by Norway and the European
Union (EU). Currently, the total quota for the shery is allocated between
the two parties with 29% to Norway and 71% to the European Union. In
Bjørndal and Lindroos [3], in a setting of discrete-time game-theoretic model,
it is analyzed how the total quota for this species should be shared between
these two parties so that both parties are satised in a steady state equilib-
rium. Taking into account the di¤erent settings of the problems, the main
contribution of our results is to formulate a continuous cost function for the
generalized Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing marginal re-
turns, which is the key step to the obtention of cyclical policies. In this
article we look upon the herring shery as if it was managed by an RFMO
adopting the behavior of a sole-owner.
The standard natural surplus growth for the North Sea herring is given
by the logistic function F (xt) = rxt(1 xt=K) where r is the intrinsic growth
rate and K is the carrying capacity of the environment.
In order to solve Problems (13) and (15), we use the following parame-
ters: p = 1; 318 NOK (Norwegian Kroner) per tonne of herring (source:
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries [18]); c = 1; 091; 700 NOK (source: Nor-
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wegian Directorate of Fisheries [18]); v = 1000 vessels; r = 0:53; K = 5:27
million tonnes; x0 = 3:591 million tonnes (source: ICES [8]); q = 0:06152;
 = 1:356;  = 0:562; where p is the price in the year 2000 and c is the cost
of operating a Norwegian purse seine for one season in the same year. We
use the upper level of the eet size of this species as a measure of the eet
size v. The intrinsic growth rate r and the carrying capacity of the environ-
ment K are based on biological data for the period 1981 2001 (Nøstbakken
and Bjørndal [19]). The initial value of the stock x0 is from the year 2001.
Bjørndal and Conrad [1] estimated the constant q; the e¤ort elasticity  and
the stock output elasticity  (see Nøstbakken and Bjørndal [19] for details
on parameter estimation).
4 Numerical results
In this section we apply the numerical algorithm to analyze the optimal
policy dynamics in the continuous harvesting model (CH) described above.
Moreover, in order to analyze the role of harvesting costs depending on the
stock size at a particular time (e.g. start of the season), we also analyze the
optimal policy dynamics in the case of a harvest function which depends on
the stock in the beginning of each period. In this case, which we call standard
harvesting case (SH), and using the harvest function (10), the harvesting
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costs are then given by
C(Xt; Ht) = cEt = c

Ht
qXt
 1

: (16)
Notice that these harvesting costs (see Nostbakken and Bjørndal, 2003) de-
pend on the stock in the beginning of each period, in contrast with the
continuous harvesting costs given by the equation (8) that take account of
the change in the stock during the shing season.
All data in the example below were generated using a Compaq AlphaServer
GS160 6/731 ALPHAWILDFIRE Computer, coded in standard FORTRAN
77. The stock levels in all numerical proofs have been normalized, taking the
carrying capacity K = 5:27 (million tonnes) as unity.
4.1 Optimal policy dynamics without xed costs
Results in Table 1 summarize relevant information on the optimal policy
dynamics without xed costs of both standard harvesting case (SH) and
continuous harvesting case (CH). In all cases, we can observe in Table 1,
columns III and VII, that cyclical policies are optimal due to the presence
of increasing marginal returns. As explained in Figure 1 below, the cyclical
optimal policies consist of a period of heavy harvesting followed by periods
of null harvest (moratoria) until the period of harvesting is achieved again.
Results in Table 1, columns II, III, IV and V correspond to the solution
of Problem (13) with cost function (16) for di¤erent discount factor values
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. This is the standard harvesting case (SH) without xed costs.
In this case, biological extinction of the resource occurs for discount fac-
tors   0:71 (discount rates  40%). The lowest stock of the cycle xSHmin
is less than the minimum spawning stock biomass benchmark Blim = 0:15
(800000 tonnes), proposed by ICES, for discount factor  2 [0:72; 0:83] (dis-
count rates range from 20% to 38%). The stock is outside safe biological
limits for high discount factor values  2 [0:84; 0:92] (discount rates range
from 8:7% to 19%) with Blim < xSHmin  Bpa, where Bpa = 0:25 (1:3 million
tonnes) is the precautionary approach reference point proposed by ICES.1
Thus, our numerical experiments show that if the harvest function de-
pends on the stock in the beginning of each period, then a high, but still
reasonable, discount rate can cause stock-collapse to be optimal even for
stocks with high growth rates and in the absence of xed costs. Even in
the case of discount factors higher than 0:93 (discount rates  7:5%), fairly
above those currently applied by economic agents, the lowest stock of the
cycle xSHmin is close to Bpa (see Table 1, column II).
Results in Table 1, columns VI, VII, VIII and IX correspond to the so-
lution of Problem (13) with cost function (8) for di¤erent discount factor
values. This is the continuous harvesting case (CH) without xed costs.
1The data used to estimate the growth function are on total biomass not on spawning
stock biomass (SSB). The SSB is (according to ICES) much smaller than total biomass.
The proportion of the SSB compared to total biomass has varied widely from less than
10% to more than 80%. In our comparison of biomass from our model and the minimum
spawning stock biomass benchmark Blim (given by ICES), the low xmin value is therefore
even more dramatic. Therefore, it reinforces our argument because if the total biomass is
below safe biological limits then certainly the spawning stock biomass must be.
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With regard to the standard harvesting case analyzed above, an explicit
cost function that depends continuously on both stock and harvest preserves
the resource at higher stock levels. In particular, the lowest stock of the cycle
xCHmin  Blim = 0:15 for discount factors   0:75 (discount rates  33%). The
stock is outside safe biological limits for discount factor values  2 [0:76; 0:84]
(discount rates range from 19% to 31%) with Blim < xCHmin  Bpa. However,
the stock remains inside safe biological levels (xCHmin > Bpa) for discount factors
 > 0:84 (discount rates < 19%).
Results in Table 1, columns IV and VIII correspond to the optimal har-
vest in the cycle for both the standard harvesting case (HSH) and continuous
harvesting case (HCH). In all cases, we can observe that the optimal harvest
in the standard harvesting case is greater than that obtained in the case
of continuous harvesting and consequently the stock becomes in danger due
to lower minimum stock in the cycles xSHmin < x
CH
min. Therefore, due to the
stock dependence in the costs a standard harvesting model that uses too
large stock (the recruitment stock) will underestimate the total costs and
thereby overestimate the value of the shing activity. On the other hand,
further numerical experiments show that, if one uses too small stock (the
escapement stock) one tends to overestimate the costs and hence underesti-
mate the value of the shery. Under/overestimating these "unit-costs" has
the normal e¤ect of increasing/decreasing the pressure on the stock (as seen
by minimum stock in the cycles xSHmin), i.e. these kind of variable costs has
a conservational implication (higher cost induces more conservative harvest
19
policy). However, in the case of continuous harvesting (CH), the optimal
policy is achieved through a more regular harvesting plan that reduces the
periods of null harvest, increasing the regularity of harvesting by reducing
the period of the optimal cycle and preserving the stock by augmenting the
minimum stock in the cycles xCHmin.
4.2 Optimal policy dynamics with avoidable xed costs
Results in Table 2 summarize relevant information on the optimal policy
dynamics in di¤erent settings for a discount factor  = 0:9 and di¤erent
values of the AFC as dened in (14). In particular, columns III, IV,V and
VI correspond to the solution of Problem (15) with cost function (16). This
is the standard harvesting case (SH) with AFC. Columns VII, VIII, IX and
X correspond to the solution of Problem (15) with cost function (8). This is
the continuous harvesting case (CH) with AFC.
In both cases, the presence of AFC changes the optimal policy dynamics
signicantly. In particular, if we compare these results with that obtained in
the absent of AFC, we can see that the risk of collapse of the species increases
signicantly even for low AFC values. For instance, in the case of c = 0:1
(AFC = 0:109 thousand million NOK), xSHmin ranges from 0:25 to 0:2 < Bpa,
and xCHmin ranges from 0:32 to 0:25 = Bpa (see Table 1, columns II and VI, for
 = 0:9, and see Table 2, columns III and VII, for c = 0:1).
We can observe in Table 2, columns II,III, IV,VII and VIII, that higher
AFC imply higher period cycles with lower minimum stocks xmin, and conse-
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quently the resource becomes in danger (xSHmin ' Blim and xCHmin < Bpa) due to
the combined e¤ect of increasing marginal returns and AFC. This is a some-
what counterintuitive result as higher costs usually are considered to have
a conservative e¤ect on the stock. However, in the presence of increasing
marginal returns cyclical optimal policies, with periods of heavy harvesting
followed by long moratoria, drive the resource below Bpa even in the absence
of AFC. Thus, if high enough AFC are also considered, then the period of the
cycles increases (larger harvesting followed by longer moratoria) in order to
avoid the AFC and consequently the risk of collapse of the species increases
signicantly.
Figure 1 represents the optimal policy dynamics with its correspond-
ing optimal harvest H and net revenue Rt for the continuous harvesting
case with AFC = 0:218 thousand million NOK (see Table 2, columns VII,
VIII and IX for c = 0:2). In particular, Figure 1a represents the concave
growth function of the resource f(xt) as dened in (2) (diagram above 45
degree line), the optimal policy correspondence (thick line), and the opti-
mal policy dynamics from the initial stock level x0 = 3:591=5:27 = 0:68
(discontinuous line). We can see in this gure that the optimal policy cor-
respondence represents the optimal stock level in the next period xt+1 (after
harvesting) as a function of the current stock level xt. For example, the op-
timal stock level xt+1 = x

1 is obtained from the initial stock level xt = x0
through the path x0 ! a ! b ! x1. In this way, the optimal policy dy-
namics from the initial stock level xt = x0 is obtained through the optimal
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path x0 ! b ! c ! d ! e ! b with the associated optimal stock levels
x1 ! x2 ! x3 ! x4 ! x1. This means that there is a strongly attractive
period-four cycle traced for t = 2001 from the initial stock level x0.
Figure 1b represents the optimal harvest H associated with the optimal
policy correspondence represented in Figure 1a. For example, the optimal
harvest from the initial stock level xt = x0, H0 = f(x0)   x1, can be ob-
tained through the path x0 ! f ! g ! H0. We can observe in Figure
1b that there is no harvesting (moratoria) at low stock (normalized) levels
x 2 [0; x0], with x0 ' 0:56, due to the fact that the optimal policy corre-
spondence coincides with the growth function of the resource xt+1 = f(xt)
for this range of stock values (see Figure 1a). With regard to the optimal
policy dynamics represented in Figure 1a, this means that, a big harvesting
H0 from the initial stock level xt = x0 is followed by three periods of null
harvest (H t = f(xt )   xt+1 = 0; t = 1; 2; 3) until the stock level xt = x4 is
achieved. The current stock level xt = x4 represents the beginning of the
period-four cycle in which the harvesting H4 = f(x4)   x1 = 0:48 million
tonnes (see Figure 1b and Table 2, column IX, for c = 0:2) is followed by
three periods of null harvest until xt = x4 is achieved again. We can observe
in Figure 1a that the lowest stock of the cycle xCHmin = x

1 = 0:25 is just the
Bpa for a discount factor  = 0:9.
Figure 1c represents the net revenue functions Rt; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4, which
correspond to the current stock levels of the optimal policy dynamics xt =
x0; x

1; x

2; x

3; x

4, as a function of the stock level in the next period xt+1. For
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example, the net revenue R0 associated with the initial stock level xt = x0
and the stock level in the next period xt+1 = x1, is obtained through the
path x0 ! a ! b ! R0. Notice that, in spite of the same optimal stock
level in the next period xt+1 = x

1 obtained from xt = x0; x

4 (see Figure 1a),
R0 > R4 (see Figure 1c) due to the fact that H0 > H4 (see Figure 1b).
Finally, we can observe in Figure 1c that Rt = 0; t = 1; 2; 3, due to the null
harvest associated with xt = x1; x

2; x

3 (see Figure 1b) which in turn implies
the absence of AFC.
5 Concluding remarks
In this article we have analyzed a shery with increasing marginal returns as
well as xed costs. Fixed costs are dened as avoidable xed costs (AFC) in
the sense that they are constant for a positive harvest level and zero when
harvesting ceases. It has been demonstrated in the previous literature that in
the presence of such non-concavities the optimal harvest policy may consist
of cyclical behavior or pulse shing instead of a steady state equilibrium.
In the present article we develop these models further by taking the stock
e¤ect during the harvesting season into account in a more general way than
earlier. Further, we show that when the harvest function is stock dependent
and there are increasing returns, steady state equilibria may very well be
suboptimal and cyclical policies can be optimal regardless the size of the AFC
even without re-entry costs. The previous literature has typically introduced
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re-entry costs in order to show that cyclical policies are optimal.
We have also shown that the role of the stock e¤ect on costs and harvest
within the harvest season. For example, if the harvest is more dependent
on the stock in the beginning of the season, then extinction may be optimal
even for stocks with high internal growth rate and without xed cost if the
discount rate is su¢ ciently high without being unreasonable. In the case of
low discount rates the stock becomes in danger due to the cyclical behavior
as this drives the stock below safe biological limits1. It is also shown that
the risk of stock collapse increases signicantly with increasing AFC as this
implies higher period cycles. This is a fairly counterintuitive result as higher
costs usually are thought of as having a conservative e¤ect on the resource,
and so are low discount rates. Furthermore, applying an oversimplied model
that estimates costs by using the stock only in the beginning of the harvesting
season will produce too high catch rates and thereby reinforce the tendency
to overexploitation.
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Table 1 
Numerical results without fixed costs for reasonable discount factor values δ[0.7,0.95].  
 
δ 
 
min
SHx  
Period of 
the cycle 
(SH) 
 
H
SH 
 
0( )
SHV x  
 
min
CHx  
Period of 
the cycle 
(CH) 
 
H
CH
 
 
0( )
CHV x  
0.7  extinction 0.79 4.270 0.09 5 0.42 3.755 
0.75 0.05 7 0.53 4.377 0.15 4 0.4 3.965 
0.8 0.13 5 0.5 4.729 0.19 4 0.44 4.394 
0.85 0.21 4 0.45 5.541 0.27 3 0.36 5.242 
0.9 0.25 4 0.48 7.445 0.32 3 0.37 7.143 
0.95 0.29 4 0.49 13.311 0.36 3 0.38 12.890 
 
The value xmin is the lowest stock of the cycle (million tonnes) in the optimal policy dynamics. The 
value H (million tonnes) is the optimal harvest in the cycle. V(x0) (thousand million NOK) is the 
net present value at initial condition x0=0.68. SH and CH represent the standard and continuous 
harvesting case, respectively.   
 
 
Table 2 
Numerical results with avoidable fixed costs (AFC) for a discount factor δ=0.9. 
 
c* 
 
AFC 
 
min
SHx  
Period of 
the cycle 
(SH) 
 
H
SH
 
 
0( )
SHV x  
 
min
CHx  
Period of 
the cycle 
(CH) 
 
H
CH
 
 
0( )
CHV x  
0.1 0.109 0.2 5 0.57 7.131 0.25 4 0.48 6.783 
0.2 0.218 0.2 5 0.57 6.864 0.25 4 0.48 6.466 
0.3 0.327 0.2 5 0.57 6.598 0.2 5 0.57 6.162 
0.4 0.437 0.16 6 0.65 6.341 0.2 5 0.57 5.896 
0.45 0.491 0.16 6 0.65 6.224 0.2 5 0.57 5.763 
0.5 0.546 0.16 6 0.65 6.108 0.2 5 0.57 5.629 
 
Avoidable fixed costs (thousand million NOK) are given by AFC=c*v, where c* is a percentage of the 
variable cost per vessel c=0.0010917 (thousand million NOK), and v=1000 is the fleet size. The value 
xmin is the lowest stock of the cycle (million tonnes) in the optimal policy dynamics. The value H 
(million tonnes) is the optimal harvest in the cycle. V(x0) (thousand million NOK) is the net present 
value at initial condition x0=0.68. SH and CH represent the standard and continuous harvesting case, 
respectively.  
   
 
 
